La perspectiva desde Brasil en 2012

En Brasil, dos escuelas de pensamiento debaten la situación actual y futura del MERCOSUR. La primera argumenta que bloque representa un serio obstáculo para la inserción de la economía brasileña en la economía global. De acuerdo con sus partidarios, es imposible negociar acuerdos comerciales en conjunto con Argentina, Uruguay y Paraguay. El ingreso de la Venezuela de Hugo Chávez aumentaría aun más la dificultad de obtener consenso entre 5 países. Además, argumentan que la presencia de Venezuela podría ser temporaria. En el caso de que Hugo Chávez perdiera el poder, la primera acción del nuevo presidente sería abandonar el MERCOSUR y tornarse miembro del ALCA, junto con Colombia, Perú y Chile. (Fuente: Uziel Nogueira – MercosurABC – 19/07/2012)

La segunda escuela acepta el hecho que el bloque representa un obstáculo para firmar acuerdos comerciales extra regionales. Sin embargo, demuestran que MERCOSUR no ha sido un impedimento para el crecimiento y modernización de la economía brasileña. Todo lo contrario. La economía brasileña ha crecido y se ha modernizado de manera constante desde la creación del bloque en los años 90. O sea, el MERCOSUR es un jugador mediano pero no compromete el resultado del partido económico global jugado por Brasil. Ahora bien, existe firme consenso entre las dos escuelas en relación al futuro del bloque. El sueño de los creadores del MERCOSUR de transformar la actual unión aduanera imperfecta en un mercado común ha muerto. Las propuestas de profundizar el bloque no tienen ninguna chance de prosperar en el futuro inmediato. Las razones son pragmáticas y no de fondo político-ideológico. La profunda crisis del experimento europeo de integración avanzada monetaria ha sido un llamado de atención para las autoridades brasileñas. La principal lección de la crisis del euro es simple y directa. Brasil no tiene los recursos ni la vocación política de tornarse en la Alemania Sudamericana. Argentina tampoco es la Francia Sudamericana. Si Brasil piensa tornarse en una potencia regional creíble en este siglo 21, antes de integrarse con Sudamérica, el país necesita integrar su propio territorio, eliminando fuerte asimetría entre regiones ricas y las pobres. Hace algún tiempo que Brasil re direcciona su estrategia de integración regional, mientras mantiene el MERCOSUR “en el freezer”. O sea, establecer y consolidar un área de libre comercio sudamericano con la economía brasileña como eje central de la misma, hub por su sigla en inglés. La integración física, aeropuertos, ferrocarriles, carreteras, es vital para concretar esta visión geopolítica estratégica, principalmente la conexión del mercado brasileño con la próspera y vital Cuenca del Pacifico.

La estrategia brasileña para su inserción internacional competitiva, requiere de una mayor presencia de sus empresas de manufacturas, constructoras y bancos en países vecinos. Economía de escala y especialización exige la expansión regional de los bancos y las empresas brasileñas para competir en los mercados globales. El mercado argentino es un excelente campo de entrenamiento para las empresas brasileñas. Según un alto dirigente de la FIESP, si una empresa brasileña consigue sobrevivir y prosperar en Argentina, la misma estará preparada para enfrentar la competencia global, incluyendo los chinos. Sin duda, los bloques de integración regional de los 90 han perdido ímpetu y fuerza en este inicio de siglo, incluyendo por supuesto MERCOSUR. Profunda crisis económica y financiera norteamericana y europea, cuna del sistema capitalista mundial, ha sido el principal factor de la declinación del regionalismo de los 90. Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea estarán concentrados en la reconstrucción de sus lastimadas economías durante los próximos años. En el caso europeo, la situación es aún más complicada. La Unión Europea, principalmente la zona euro, se encuentran peligrosamente próximas a una desintegración. China emerge como única potencia económica-comercial con fuerza suficiente para diseñar propia estrategia de inserción / integración global. En mi visión, la economía brasileña será parte integrante del bloque chino a través de acciones de coordinación del BRICS. En conclusión, el sueño de un MERCOSUR profundo, al estilo europeo años 90 ha muerto. Como dice el dicho porteño: “billetera mata galán”.

Link: http://www.mercosurabc.com.ar/nota.asp?IdNota=3384&IdSeccion=7 

Gloomy Forecast for States, Even if Economy Rebounds

The fiscal crisis for states will persist long after the economy rebounds as confront rising health care costs, underfunded pensions, ignored infrastructure needs, eroding revenues, expected federal budget cuts, according to a report issued here Tuesday by a task force of respected budget experts. The problems facing states are often masked by lax budget laws and opaque accounting practices, according to report, an independent analysis of six large states released by State Budget Crisis Task Force. It said that the financial collapse of 2008, which caused most serious fiscal crisis for states since Great Depression, exposed deep-set financial challenges that will worsen if no action is taken. “The ability of the states to meet their obligations to public employees, to creditors and most critically to education and well-being of their citizens is threatened,” warned the chairmen of the task force, Richard Ravitch, a former lieutenant governor of New York, and Paul A. Volcker, a former chairman of Federal Reserve. Report added a strong dose of fiscal pessimism just as many states have seen their immediate budget pressures begin to ease. And it called into question how states will restore services they have cut during downturn, saying that the loss of jobs in prisons, hospitals, courts and agencies have been more severe than in any of past nine recessions. “This is a fundamental shift in the way governments have responded to recessions and appears to signal a willingness to ‘unbuild’ state government in a way that has not been done before,” it said, noting that court systems had cut their hours in many states, delaying actions including divorce settlements and criminal trials. The report arrived at a delicate political moment. States are deciding whether to expand their Medicaid programs to cover the uninsured poor as part of the new health care law, with the federal government pledging to pay the full cost at first. Public-sector unions feel besieged, as states and cities from Wisconsin to San Jose, Calif., have moved to save money on pensions. Washington’s focus on deficit reduction, with big budget cuts scheduled for after fall election, has made cuts to state aid inevitable, many governors believe. If federal grants to the states were cut by just 10%, the report said, the loss to state and local government budgets would be more than $60 billion a year, nearly twice the size of combined tax increases that states enacted during the fiscal crisis from 2008 to 2011. Things are worse than they appear, report contends. Even before recession, Medicaid spending was growing faster than state revenues, and the downturn led to higher caseloads, making the program biggest share of state spending, as states have cut aid to schools and universities. States have not set aside enough money to cover the health and retirement benefits they owe their workers. Important revenue sources are being eroded: states are losing billions of sales tax dollars to Internet sales and to an economy in which consumer spending has shifted from buying goods to buying lightly taxed services. Gas tax revenues have not kept up with urgent infrastructure needs. And distressed cities and counties pose challenges to states (…..)

Link: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/us/in-report-on-states-finances-a-grim-long-term-forecast.html

Latin American Integration: 200 Years of Efforts

Latin American integration efforts have been a continuous fixture throughout much of the last century, but in recent years there has been a flurry of new initiatives, with leaders re-emphasizing regional ties. The increasing number of high-profile presidential, ministerial summits, have brought renewed promises and commitments to deepen regional political, economic, social, and developmental cooperation, and have spurred creation of new political and economic bodies tasked with uniting the region. Though in part due to a global shift toward regionalism, it also reflects real potential benefits of an integrated Latin America. Economically, the combined markets would give the region substantially more heft on the global stage. Geopolitically, greater unity would enable these nations to garner United States’ and other world powers’ attention, better promote their interests in multilateral discussions and negotiations. In general, it could improve opportunities and wellbeing of the some six hundred million Latin Americans. Latin America’s integration is bolstered by its widespread support from average citizens. Within the region, polls show that over half of each country’s population (and in some places up to three-quarters) support both economic and political integration. Democratic politicians have played up these visions for electoral gain, most notably, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has drummed up support by promoting his integration initiatives (as the way to foil perceived U.S. regional designs). But Chavez and his contemporaries are not the first leaders to make such promises. South America’s first grand integration efforts began in the early nineteenth century under the leadership of General Simón Bolivar during the wars of independence. He envisioned uniting northern South America into Gran Colombia, and creating a league of American republics with a common military, mutual defense pact, and a supranational parliamentary assembly. This dream, and the Bolivar’s presidency, ended in 1830. After World War II, integrationist efforts reemerged. In 1947 nineteen nations (which later became 23) signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (also known as the Rio Treaty), where they vowed to defend each other against outside aggression. The Organization of American States (OAS) followed in 1948 (building on a previous turn-of-the-century institution), promising to promote social and economic development through a four-pronged emphasis on democracy, human rights, security, development. In late 1950s the hemisphere came together to form Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), designed not only to encourage economic development but also to advance regional integration through its internal Institute for Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL). In 1960, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico led their neighbors in the creation of Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC), the first attempt at a regional intergovernmental body. Its goal was to establish free trade throughout the whole region in twelve years (it failed). This effort was renewed in 1980 by the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), which promoted a more gradual approach to creating a common market (it is still officially in the works) (…..)

Link: http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/07/17/latin-american-integration-two-hundred-years-of-efforts/

German Arms Firms Seek Cooperation with India

When it comes to arm purchases, India is already a global power: In the next decade, country plans to purchase at least €100 billion ($120 billion) worth of weapons. Just last year, India’s defense budget grew by 34%, and it will swell by almost 18% this year. For arms exporters, it is a huge business opportunity and one that the German defense industry is keen to get in on. Germany, for its part, is the world’s third-largest weapons exporter; almost 100,000 people work in industry. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Germany controls 11% of global trade in conventional weapons. The country exports as many arms as France and Great Britain. Yet so far, German arms manufacturers haven’t had much luck in India. The country’s business landscape is complicated, with corruption playing a prominent role. It isn’t uncommon for companies to stumble over the inscrutable maze. Five years ago, for example, New Delhi cancelled a deal for helicopters produced by the European defense giant EADS on account of corruption investigations. In March, Rheinmetall Air Defense, a Switzerland-based subsidiary of the German automotive and defense company Rheinmetall, was banned from the Indian arms market for its involvement in a bribery scandal. «As far as I can remember, the last big deal India did with Germany was buying submarines, Class 209, in 1989,» says Rumel Dahiya, a retired brigadier general now serving as the deputy director general of the New Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, which claims to be a «non-partisan, autonomous body,» though it was established in 1965 by India’s Ministry of Defense. When asked about country’s goals, Dahiya said: «We want as much technological transfer as possible. We want to build and assemble as much as possible in India because India’s arms industry wants to become independent». Indian law requires that at least 30% of arms must be purchased from domestic suppliers. This allows the country not only to secure a share of the value-creation, but also to acquire more know-how. Such a sentiment may sound like a desire to one day produce in India the products offered by foreign manufacturers. But it is a blessing for German arms industry. German export laws impose requirements on arms that are viewed as restrictive when compared to those of other countries. As such, German arms companies have resorted to exploiting loopholes in the laws: They are only too happy to set up joint enterprises with companies in the target countries so they can manufacture products there. Individual parts delivered to these countries are not subject to same strict regulations that apply to finished products. Domestically, there is growing opposition to this practice, particularly among center-left opposition. «There is essentially no oversight on German arms exports,» says Jan van Aken, the speaker on foreign-policy matters for Left Party in Germany parliament. «And whenever things get difficult, the industry is quick to immediately move production to the target country.» Katja Keul, a member of the Green Party who sits on the Bundestag’s defense committee, complains that Chancellor Angela Merkel’s conservative coalition government effectively goes behind parliament’s back by making decisions on arms exports within the Federal Security Council, nine-member body made up of chancellor and several ministers that meets behind closed doors. «The German Bundestag doesn’t even receive information on the process after a permit has been awarded,» Keul says. «The relocation of production facilities of German arms firms abroad is difficult enough to control», «but the government has unfortunately actively helped by approving licenses for them to manufacture abroad.» Still, Keul continues, issue is not ascribing blame to Merkel’s coalition government or being forced to acknowledge things were no better under the governments that preceded it (…..)

Link: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/growing-resistance-to-german-arms-exports-to-india-a-844934.html

As China Talks of Change, Fear Rises on the Risks

A heavyweight crowd gathered last October for a banquet in Beijing’s tallest skyscraper. Son of Mao Zedong’s immediate successor was there, as was the daughter of country’s No. 2 military official for nearly three decades, along with the half sister of China’s president-in-waiting, and many more. “All you had to do,” said one attendee, Zhang Lifan, “was look at the number of luxury cars and the low numbers on the plates.” Most surprising, though, was the reason for the meeting. A small coterie of children of China’s founding elites who favor deeper political and economic change had come to debate the need for a new direction under the next generation of Communist Party leaders, who are set to take power in a once-a-decade changeover set to begin this year. Many had met the previous August, and would meet again in February. The private gatherings are a telling indicator of how even some in elite are worried about the course the Communist Party is charting for China’s future. And to advocates of political change, they offer hope influential party members support the idea that tomorrow’s China should give citizens more power to choose their leaders and seek redress for grievances, two longtime complaints about current system. But the problem is that even as tiny band of political reformers is attracting more influential adherents, it is splintered into factions that cannot agree on what “reform” would be, much less how to achieve it. The fundamental shifts that are crucial to their demands, a legal system beyond Communist Party control as well as elections with real rules and real choices among candidates, are seen even among the most radical as distant dreams, at best part of a second phase of reform. In addition, the political winds are not blowing in their favor. The spectacular fall this spring of Bo Xilai, the Politburo member who openly espoused a populist philosophy at odds with elite leaders, offered an object lesson in the dangers of challenging the status quo. And official silence surrounding his case underscores high-level fears that any public cracks in the leadership’s facade of unity could lead its power to crumble. As a result, few people here expect the party to willingly refashion itself anytime soon. And even those within elite prepared to discuss deeper changes, including the second-generation “princelings,” as they are known, have a stake in protecting their own privileges. “Compare now to 1989; in ’89, reformers had the upper hand,” said Mr. Zhang, historian formerly associated with government’s Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, referring to the pro-democracy student protests that enjoyed support of a number of important party leaders but were crushed in Tiananmen Square. “Twenty years later, the reformers have grown weaker. Now there are so many vested interests that they’ll be taken out if they touch anyone else’s interests.” To Mr. Zhang and others, this is the conundrum of China’s rise: autocracy that back-flipped on Marxist ideology to forge world’s second-largest economy seems incapable of embracing the political changes that could prolong its own survival. Much as many Americans bemoan a gridlocked government split by a yawning partisan gap, Chinese advocates for change lament an all-powerful Communist Party they say is gridlocked by intersecting self-interests. None of dominant players, a wealthy and commanding elite; rich and influential state industries; a vast, entrenched bureaucracy, stand to gain by ceding power to the broader public. Many who identify with reform camp see change as inevitable anyway, but only, because social upheaval will force it. In that view, discontent with growing inequality, corruption, pollution and other societal ills will inevitably lead to a more democratic society or a sharp turn toward totalitarianism. An overriding worry is that unless change is carefully planned and executed, China risks another Cultural Revolution-style upheaval that could set it back decades (…..)

Link: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/world/asia/as-china-talks-of-change-fear-rises-on-risks.html