Amores imposibles

Nunca han sido fáciles las relaciones entre China y Japón. A los desencuentros históricos se unen diferencias geopolíticas, litigios territoriales, la competencia económica, comercial y energética en un tiempo de transición en el que un nuevo mapa se está perfilando en la región. Repunte álgido del contencioso en torno a las islas Diaoyu/ Senkaku refleja la fragilidad e inestabilidad de las relaciones bilaterales, siempre amenazadas por sombras de tensión difíciles de erradicar, pero también la respectiva pugna por redefinir lugar de cada cual en inmediato entorno asiático, y por añadidura, en el caso chino, el traslado de un claro mensaje de autoafirmación a EE UU. Para China, el entendimiento solamente es posible a partir de una asunción por parte de Japón de sus responsabilidades históricas (la reparación de los daños infligidos durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial) y una mayor implicación regional. A Japón, por otra parte, le resulta difícil encajar despertar chino y sus consecuencias regionales, en especial en el entorno del sudeste asiático. Ninguna de ambas capitales desea que ganen en trascendencia las diferencias históricas, las tensiones energéticas o las disputas en torno a Taiwán y las Diaoyu, pero la secuencia de pasos adelante y atrás complica, enerva y dificulta la capacidad mutua para superar diferencias y construir una relación con vocación transformadora de la región. Los agujeros de la relación bilateral no son de carácter económico, pero afectan a temas muy sensibles. En Pekín se ha reprobado a Tokio por haber concedido un visado a la líder uigur Rebiya Kadeer. Igualmente, el hecho que Japón permita a los residentes taiwaneses en su país registrarse como tales ha merecido una nota de protesta. Desde 2005 existe un diálogo estratégico bilateral que nació con el propósito de desbloquear el desentendimiento que se vivía desde 2001, cuando el primer ministro Koizumi reanudó las visitas al santuario de Yasukuni, donde se venera a fallecidos japoneses en combate, incluidos varios criminales de guerra. Hu Jintao mostró una actitud más favorable hacia Japón que la exteriorizada por su antecesor, Jiang Zemin, y apostó por una mayor integración regional, convencido que así podría atenuar tensiones bilaterales. Las esperanzas que despertó Shinzo Abe en 2006, quien eligió China como su primera visita al exterior, pronto se disiparon. El presidente chino visitó Tokio en 2008 tras otra anterior del primer ministro Wen Jiabao. Ambos tanteaban la posibilidad de ganar terreno a las discrepancias para construir una relación bilateral a la altura de los requerimientos de un siglo XXI en el que Asia debería demostrar su mayoría de edad. Tras la victoria del PDJ (Partido Democrático de Japón) en 2009, muchos pensaron que mejorarían las condiciones para articular una mayor proximidad. Pero no fue así. Hu acarició la idea de articular Asia como un poder regional hasta 2009. En la visita que realizó al Japón del primer ministro Fukuda en 2008 se gestaba una posible refundación de Asia oriental con la mirada puesta en entendimiento trilateral con Corea del Sur que daría primeros pasos a finales de ese año. En el entendimiento con Japón e India radica la clave para que el ascenso económico asiático pueda derivar también en una máxima incidencia política global, superando y acomodando las rivalidades naturales por el liderazgo. Pero ni Japón ni India aceptan fácilmente el liderazgo chino, al menos si este se plantea en su forma tradicional. Tampoco EEUU. (Fuente: Xulio Ríos – El Pais.com – 18/09/2012)

Acerca de ignaciocovelo
Consultor Internacional

4 Responses to Amores imposibles

  1. Oh, the irony. This was supposed to be the “Friendship Year of Japan-China People to People Exchanges,” marking 40 years of diplomatic ties between the World War II enemies. What we’re seeing, instead, is deepening dislike, even hatred, over ownership of a clutch of islands in the East China Sea. With the U.S. defense secretary, Leon E. Panetta, in town talking about the dispute with his Chinese counterpart, and violent anti-Japanese — sometimes anti-foreign — demonstrations sweeping China, how concerned should the world be? The short answer: pretty concerned, though more for long-term than short-term reasons. As Deng Yuwen, an editor at Study Times, a magazine run by the Communist Party’s Central Party School, wrote in Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao newspaper, being nationalist in China is “politically correct,” and the government has long relied on a muscular nationalism to bolster its legitimacy. (Read the article, reposted on Chinese-language web sites). That makes anti-outsider sentiment in China a deep force that could, in theory, be turned against any neighbor. And China has territorial disputes with many neighbors — Japan, but also Vietnam, the Philippines and India (over the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as part of Tibet.) But first, the immediate background: starting last weekend, government-tolerated demonstrations have taken place in scores of cities in China, with cars and department stores burned and Japanese-style shops smashed as people protested against the purchase last week by the Japanese government of three of the Diaoyu (as China calls them) or Senkaku (as Japan calls them) islands. Japanese citizens here are frightened to go out. Electronics giants like Panasonic and Canon have shuttered production in local factories, the popular clothing retailer Uniqlo has closed many stores and hundreds of Japanese-style eateries and businesses, including 7-Eleven (it is Japanese-owned in China), were shut. Political visits between Japan and China are canceled and even operas and writers’ meetings are off. On Tuesday, thousands of angry Chinese marched again in Beijing and Shanghai against Japan. As my colleagues Ian Johnson and Thom Shanker wrote from Beijing, the protests were highly organized but also crudely threatening, not just towards Japanese, but towards foreigners in general (…..)

    http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/the-meaning-of-the-china-japan-island-dispute/

  2. Professor Uziel Nogueira says: Conflicts between China and Japan are always played in two levels i.e, the Asian and global context. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Japanese war fleet achieved an unprecedented victory i..e, it defeated the Russian war navy in the Sea of Japan. Embolden by its naval prowess and feeling racially-culturally superior, Japan went to conquer neighboring countries, including parts of China. Japan rise and fall was rapid and short. The decision to attack the US in 1941 was fatal.


    Japan’s defeat in world war II went beyond the military aspect. It destroyed the country’s desire to rule Asia. Japan became a US protectorate dedicated to produce high quality manufactured goods.

    The conflict evolving sovereignty of the small islets of Diaoyu – Senkaku (that China will win) is a crisis that will not be wasted by Beijing’s political leadership. First, it will prove that China is the new uncontested super power in the Asia Pacific region. Second, it will show that the military alliance Japan-US has lost its effectiveness of the past. The US is not in a position to send war ships to protect Japanese claims.


    Ironically, the sovereignty of a small group of islands in the South China Sea may become the most powerful symbol of China’s rise in this new century.

    http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/the-meaning-of-the-china-japan-island-dispute/

  3. No matter what they’re called by their claimants in China, Japan and Taiwan, the East Asian islands at the center of an angry dispute are little more than remote shards of guano-covered rock. Hardly deserving of the word “islands,” they’re more like protrusions, more like carbuncles. No people live on them, although you half expect a wizened Japanese soldier to emerge from one of the caves, brandishing his rifle, thinking World War II is still being fought. And in a way, it still is. “Hardly postcard quality” is how my colleague Martin Fackler described the islands after taking a seven-hour boat ride from one of Japan’s southernmost ports. The islets are called the Senkakus in Japan, the Diaoyu islands in China and Tiaoyutai in Taiwan. There’s no tourism, no military potential, no real strategic value. There’s no there there. Still, a negotiated resolution of the volatile dispute seems unlikely. The Japanese far right and choleric Chinese nationalists have been dialing up the volume over the islands, seemingly at times with the unspoken approval of their governments. Conservative Japanese politicians have been driving things from their end, while violent anti-Japanese protests in China have drawn thousands, this in a country where the gathering of a few dozen pro-democracy activists would bring out battalions of helmeted riot police, undercover cops and paddy wagons. The real dispute over the islands is not about oil, gas, sea lanes or fishing rights. Instead, the prevailing emotion is a leftover bitterness from the war, combined with the persistent image of an insufficiently repentant Japan. As the analyst Daniel Sneider told Rendezvous, “It’s not about territory. It’s not about these rocks. It’s about much, much more. It’s identity, first and foremost. It’s pride.” In the face of deep emotions and official intransigence, it seems unlikely that Beijing, Tokyo and Taipei might agree to a radically simple notion: All three nations would stand down and renounce their claims, thereby settling things. Nobody would win, so nobody would lose (…..)

    http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/how-to-settle-the-fight-over-some-guano-covered-rocks/

  4. Professor Uziel Nogueira says: The Senkaku/Diaoyu conflict will not be resolved under any UN international tribunal. Would the US accept the UN to settle down Cuba’s claim on Guantanamo Bay? or Great Britain in the case of Falklands/Malvinas in the South Atlantic? The Senkaku/Diaoyu is a conflict between China-US using Japan as a proxy. After its defeat in 1945, Japan became a US protectorate. The question is: Will the US run the risk of a naval confrontation with China for a desolated volcanic islets, described as there’s no tourism, no military potential, no real strategic value. There’s nothing in there? The Japanese elite feels frustrated by the fact that Japan has lost its way in the 21t st century. However, this is another conflict that Japan’s proud samurai descendant elite cannot win. It is the wrong conflict at the wrong time. One thing was to lose face to the most powerful western super power in the 20th century, the USA. A different thing is to lose face to the new Asian super power in the 21st century, China. Japan made a political mistake in initiating this conflict. There is no elegant way out.

    http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/how-to-settle-the-fight-over-some-guano-covered-rocks/

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