“Las condiciones del rescate a España deben ser amplias”

El demonio económico de EEUU es la Gran Depresión; el de esta Europa tan y tan alemana es la inflación. Los alemanes sienten un miedo cerval por ese fenómeno económico, por el recuerdo de las estratosféricas subidas de precios de los años 20, por el temor a que la inflación se coma sus ahorros. El guardián de las esencias encargado de evitar a toda costa que eso ocurra es el Bundesbank, el banco central presidido por Jens Weidmann, que ejerce una influencia imperial sobre el BCE. Weidmann, exasesor áulico de la canciller Merkel, se granjeó las iras de los halcones antiinflacionistas hace unas semanas al mostrarse abiertamente a favor de incrementos salariales en la industria germana: un aire fresco en esa habitación cerrada a cal y canto que es la sacrosanta austeridad alemana. ¿Cree que 100.000 millones de euros son suficientes para rescatar España, teniendo en cuenta el rumbo de la recesión y el vínculo entre bancos y los bonos soberanos? Por lo general no hago conjeturas con las cifras. En cuanto a la valoración de las necesidades de financiación, confío en el FMI y en los evaluadores externos. Por lo que sabemos ahora, cantidad debatida parece contener margen de seguridad suficiente. La decisión del Gobierno español es importante porque mitiga la incertidumbre sobre la solvencia de sus bancos y de este modo contribuye a la estabilización de los mercados financieros. Agradezco el hecho de que el Gobierno español ya no espere respaldo económico sin condiciones. Estas deben ser un elemento fundamental de cualquier ayuda económica. En los 2 últimos años España ha aplicado reformas en mercado laboral, pensiones y el sistema financiero, ha hecho recortes en gasto y ha incrementado impuestos. ¿Qué sucederá ahora? ¿Qué reformas tiene en mente? El mensaje clave es que el sistema bancario es reflejo de la economía. Evidencia la situación de las finanzas públicas a través del vínculo con los bonos soberanos. Refleja la competitividad de la economía y los desequilibrios que se han acumulado en el pasado, como la burbuja del sector inmobiliario. Una solución integral incluye más reformas y soluciones en diversos ámbitos. Algunos desafíos concretos son la transparencia y el control de la ejecución presupuestaria en las regiones, abordar segmentación del mercado laboral. Junto con las reformas del mercado de trabajo ya anunciadas, esto podría dar nuevas esperanzas a los jóvenes desempleados. Pero el Gobierno español dice justamente lo contrario: solo hay condiciones para los bancos. ¿Cuáles serán las verdaderas condiciones para el rescate de España? Debido a interconexión de los diferentes ámbitos políticos, creo que condiciones van a ser amplias. La impresión de que este es un rescate sin condiciones fuera del sistema financiero ya está erosionando el compromiso con los términos de los programas actuales. ¿Existe el riesgo de que otros países, como Irlanda o Portugal, puedan pedir las mismas condiciones y ajustes? Ese es justamente el problema fundamental. En Irlanda y Portugal existe un debate sobre la relajación de las condiciones, en Grecia está cobrando impulso. Pero insistir en solucionar los problemas estructurales perpetuará la crisis, y la reacción del mercado refleja esta preocupación (…..)

Link: http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2012/06/14/actualidad/1339706146_937066.html

Acerca de ignaciocovelo
Consultor Internacional

11 Responses to “Las condiciones del rescate a España deben ser amplias”

  1. (Autoria) Comentario del Prof. Uziel Nogueira: Grecia es el inicio (alfa) de la crisis de la deuda en la zona euro mientras Alemania es el fin (omega). La entrevista con Jens Weidmann, presidente del Bundesbank, ofrece importantes pistas sobre el pensamiento alemán. Por detrás del techno-speak, el mensaje de Weidmann es claro y contundente. Alemania no salvará ningún país miembro de la zona euro. El contribuyente alemán no pagará la cuenta por la fiesta de los años 90. Todo lo contrario, los países altamente endeudados sostendrán el coste social para salir de la crisis y, eventualmente, de la zona euro. El limite alemán para apoyar sus socios de la moneda común ha sido la contribución al fondo de rescate de $ 500,000 millones. Alemania esta decidida a no jugar el juego de los mercados financieros. Ningún euro adicional para fogonear la especulación financiera. Para la nueva generación europea — con escaso conocimiento sobre Alemania — recomiendo la lectura del libro “The End: The defiance and destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1944-1945.” del historiador ingles Ian Kershaw.

    http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2012/06/14/actualidad/1339706146_937066.html

  2. The parallels between Europe in the 1930s and Europe today are stark, striking, and increasingly frightening. We see unemployment, youth unemployment especially, soaring to unprecedented heights. Financial instability and distress are widespread. There is growing political support for extremist parties of the far left and right. Both the existence of these parallels and their tragic nature would not have escaped Charles Kindleberger, whose World in Depression, 1929-1939 was published exactly 40 years ago, in 1973. Where Kindleberger’s canvas was the world, his focus was Europe. While much of the earlier literature, often authored by Americans, focused on the Great Depression in the US, Kindleberger emphasised that the Depression had a prominent international and, in particular, European dimension. It was in Europe where many of the Depression’s worst effects, political as well as economic, played out. And it was in Europe where the absence of a public policy authority at the level of the continent and the inability of any individual national government or central bank to exercise adequate leadership had the most calamitous economic and financial effects. These were ideas that Kindleberger impressed upon generations of students as well on his reading public. Indeed, anyone fortunate enough to live in New England in the early 1980s and possessed of even a limited interest in international financial and monetary history felt compelled to walk, drive or take the T (as metropolitan Boston’s subway is known to locals) down to MIT’s Sloan Building in order to listen to Kindleberger’s lectures on the subject (including both the authors of this preface). We understood about half of what he said and recognised about a quarter of the historical references and allusions. The experience was intimidating: Paul Krugman, who was a member of this same group and went on to be awarded the Nobel Prize for his work in international economics, has written how Kindleberger’s course nearly scared him away from international macroeconomics. Kindleberger’s lectures were surely “full of wisdom”, Krugman notes. But then, “who feels wise in their twenties?” (Krugman 2002). There was indeed much wisdom in Kindleberger’s lectures, about how markets work, about how they are managed, and especially about how they can go wrong. It is no accident that when Martin Wolf, dean of the British financial journalists, challenged then former-US Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers in 2011 to deny that economists had proven themselves useless in the 2008-9 financial crisis, Summers’s response was that, to the contrary, there was a useful economics. But what was useful for understanding financial crises was to be found not in the academic mainstream of mathematical models festooned with Greek symbols and complex abstract relationships but in the work of the pioneering 19th century financial journalist Walter Bagehot, the 20th-century bubble theorist Hyman Minsky, and “perhaps more still in Kindleberger” (Wolf and Summers 2011). Summers was right. We speak from personal experience: for a generation the two of us have been living – very well, thank you – off the rich dividends thrown off by the intellectual capital that we acquired from Charles Kindleberger, earning our pay cheques by teaching our students some small fraction of what Charlie taught us. Three lessons stand out, the first having to do with panic in financial markets, the second with the power of contagion, the third with the importance of hegemony (…..)

    http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2012/06/new-preface-to-charles-kindleberger-the-world-in-depression-1929-1939/

  3. (…..) “The 1929 depression was so wide, so deep and so long because the international economic system was rendered unstable by British inability and United States unwillingness to assume responsibility for stabilising it in three particulars: (a) maintaining a relatively open market for distress goods; (b) providing counter-cyclical long-term lending; and (c) discounting in crisis…. The world economic system was unstable unless some country stabilised it, as Britain had done in the nineteenth century and up to 1913. In 1929, the British couldn’t and the United States wouldn’t. When every country turned to protect its national private interest, the world public interest went down the drain, and with it the private interests of all…” (…..)

    http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2012/06/new-preface-to-charles-kindleberger-the-world-in-depression-1929-1939/

  4. (…..) The German federal government, the political incarnation of the single most consequential economic power in Europe, is one potential hegemon. It has room for countercyclical fiscal policy. It could encourage the European Central Bank to make more active use of monetary policy. It could fund a Marshall Plan for Greece and signal a willingness to assume joint responsibility, along with its EU partners, for some fraction of their collective debt. But Germany still thinks of itself as the steward is a small open economy. It repeats at every turn that it is beyond its capacity to stabilise the European system: “German taxpayers can only bear so much after all”. Unilaterally taking action to stabilise the European economy is not, in any case, its responsibility, as the matter is perceived. The EU is not a union where big countries lead and smaller countries follow docilely but, at least ostensibly, a collection of equals. Germany’s own difficult history in any case makes it difficult for the country to assert its influence and authority and equally difficult for its EU partners, even those who most desperately require it, to accept such an assertion.6 Europe, everyone agrees, needs to strengthen its collective will and ability to take collective action. But in the absence of a hegemon at the European level, this is easier said than done (…..)

    http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2012/06/new-preface-to-charles-kindleberger-the-world-in-depression-1929-1939/

  5. (…..) In a sense, Kindleberger predicted all this in 1973. He saw the power and willingness of the US to bear the responsibility and burden of sacrifice required of benevolent hegemony as likely to falter in subsequent generations. He saw three positive and three negative branches on the then-future’s probability tree. The positive outcomes were: “[i] revived United States leadership… [ii] an assertion of leadership and assumption of responsibility… by Europe…” [sitting here, in 2013, one might be tempted to add emerging markets like China as potentially stepping into the leadership breach, although in practice the Chinese authorities have been reluctant to go there, and] [iii] cession of economic sovereignty to international institutions….” Here, in a sense, Kindleberger had both global and regional – meaning European – institutions in mind. “The last”, meaning a global solution, “is the most attractive”, he concluded,” but perhaps, because difficult, the least likely…” The negative outcomes were: “(a) the United States and the [EU] vying for leadership… (b) one unable to lead and the other unwilling, as in 1929 to 1933… (c) each retaining a veto… without seeking to secure positive programmes…” As we write, the North Atlantic world appears to have fallen foul to his bad outcome (c), with extraordinary political dysfunction in the US preventing its government from acting as a benevolent hegemon, and the ruling mandarins of Europe, in Germany in particular, unwilling to step up and convince their voters that they must assume the task. It was fear of this future that led Kindleberger to end The World in Depression with the observation: “In these circumstances, the third positive alternative of international institutions with real authority and sovereignty is pressing.” Indeed it is, more so now than ever.

    http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2012/06/new-preface-to-charles-kindleberger-the-world-in-depression-1929-1939/

  6. (…..) An opinion poll last week provides just the latest proof that Sarrazin has his finger on the national pulse: Over half of Germans think their country has suffered by joining the euro, while 79 percent reject eurobonds as a solution to the crisis. Sarrazin – a former regional politician and Bundesbank governor who was stripped of his official positions because of his views on immigration – is not a man to do things by halves. His book breaks not one but two German taboos by linking Holocaust guilt with questions about the sustainability of the euro. (It is designed to be a refutation of Angela Merkel’s argument that the breakup of the euro would lead to the breakup of the EU.) But although – or rather because – Sarrazin is so good at mirroring public opinion, the German political establishment is falling over itself to bury his arguments: Peer Steinbrueck, the former finance minister (and possible candidate for chancellor), described it as “bullshit”; while the current finance minister, Wolfgang Schaueble, described it as “appalling nonsense.” The antics of Thilo Sarrazin are a product of the constrained, elitist nature of German politics where – after the experience of National Socialism – many topics are declared outside the realm of political competition. As a result, all mainstream parties are in favor of Europe, the euro and the Atlantic alliance, and against war, inflation and nationalism. The result is a restricted political sphere where politicians have often been able to act against public opinion without fear of challenge – including the decision to replace the über-popular Deutschmark with the strikingly unpopular euro. But those who dare cross the threshold of political correctness – as Sarrazin has repeatedly done – tap into a vast reservoir of pent-up popular frustration. And because the establishment cartel turns them into outcasts rather than arguing with their views, this reservoir continues to grow (…..)

    http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/05/31/the-dark-flip-side-of-european-technocracy/

  7. (…..) What is worrying is that Germany’s leaders are now trying to treat foreign politicians who question German orthodoxy the same way they treat their own populists. When I was last in Berlin, I asked one of Merkel’s aides what he thought her greatest achievements during the crisis were. He replied: “We could teach the neocons a thing or two about regime change.” He may have been joking, but the brutal way that Merkel and Sarkozy used markets to topple Berlusconi and Papandreou has been replicated in the treatment of other leaders. First, Angela Merkel tried to dismiss François Hollande – not simply saying she disagreed with his views on the fiscal compact but refusing to meet him during the election campaign (the implication since the election is that it is all right to campaign in French, so long as you govern in German). And now they are trying to turn Alexis Tsirpas – the firebrand leader of the Greek anti-austerity Syriza party – into a non-person. A chorus of European politicians are trying to scare the living daylights out of the Greek people in the hope that the electorate will give a mandate to the mainstream New Democracy party, which had supported the bailout package. My hunch is that this approach is unlikely to deliver a mandate for New Democracy, and even if it succeeds, it could be undesirable. If European leaders want a sustainable deal that keeps Greece in the euro, they would do better to bind parties like Syriza into an agreement than to tie themselves to an ancien régime that has already lost much of its credibility. One of the ironies of the last few days is that Angela Merkel allegedly asked the Greek prime minister to call a referendum on whether Greece should stay in the euro. Back in December, Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy forced George Papandreou out of office for suggesting just such a referendum. At the time, I believed that allowing the political process to unfold might have given Papandreou a mandate for standing by his agreements with the EU. However by suspending the political process and imposing a technocratic government, Merkozy did lasting damage to the legitimacy of formal politics in Greece and has created the conditions for populism to flourish. The situation in Greece shows how Europe’s technocratic tendency is leading to a strong populist backlash. The traditional “Monnet method” of European integration – named after the French founder of the EU who tried to turn political issues into bureaucratic ones – has dramatically narrowed the political space in member states without creating any widening of the space for politics at a European level. Telling a politician such as François Hollande – who has received a mandate to renegotiate the fiscal compact – or Alexis Tsirpas in Greece that “there is no alternative” sends a terrible message to European publics: They can change governments but not policies.


    The markets have a legitimate fear that unless leaders take the necessary steps toward integration, the EU will collapse. But this approach of imposing rules on the grounds that there is no alternative in fact risks creating a full-blown rebellion, making it harder for countries such as Greece to undertake reforms (…..)

    http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/05/31/the-dark-flip-side-of-european-technocracy/

  8. El Gobierno no planea, de momento, poner en marcha las medidas que recomienda el FMI en el informe sobre España conocido ayer, entre las que se encuentra una subida del IVA y una bajada de los sueldos de los funcionarios. Después de que ayer varios ministros no se dieran por enterados, esta mañana Mariano Rajoy ha restado importancia, en una conversación informal con periodistas, a esas recomendaciones, descartando que se vayan a seguir, al menos de forma inmediata. Lo que no quiere decir, ha aclarado el presidente, que se pare el programa de reformas. El jefe del Ejecutivo, que a su llegada a la clausura de la reunión interparlamentaria del PP en San Sebastián ha admitido que “hay problemas, pero está todo ordenado”, ha avanzado además una de las próximas medidas de su Gabinete: la reforma de la administración pública. Rajoy no se ha referido directamente al IVA ni a ninguna otra medida en concreto y se ha limitado a recordar que la publicación de esos informes es algo habitual, y que muchas otras instituciones internacionales, como la Comisión Europea, también los elaboran periódicamente. Aun así, en su opinión, a veces se les da demasiada importancia. El horizonte europeo, la coordinación y la integración entre los países constituyen, por otro lado, la prioridad del Gobierno. Es el marco en el que vuelven a moverse todas las decisiones, y las esperanzas, del Ejecutivo. Lo ha destacado Rajoy, ya públicamente, ante dirigentes y parlamentarios del PP, al recordar que “Europa es un proyecto que se ha ido construyendo y que hoy necesita políticas, no reglamentos”. “Y colaboraré con todos aquellos que quieran trabajar en esta dirección, para que haya más Europa”, ha agregado el presidente. “Necesita más integración política, más integración fiscal y bancaria. Y tiene que transmitir un mensaje al mundo de que el euro es un proyecto irreversible”. Europa, ha insistido Rajoy, “debe apoyar a Grecia”. “Queremos que Grecia siga en el euro y que cumpla sus compromisos”, ha dicho antes de añadir: “Estoy convencido de que los cumplirá y que seguirá en el euro, y esa será una extraordinaria noticia para España y el conjunto de los europeos” (…..)

    http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/06/16/actualidad/1339843421_839209.html

  9. (Autoria) Comentario del Prof. Uziel Nogueira: La probable salida de Grecia de la zona euro es una mala noticia para España por dos razones. Uno, la salida griega fortalece el euro pues elimina un eslabón débil entre los 17 países miembro de la moneda común. Elimina el incentivo por parte de Alemania de rescatar otros países endeudados con condicionalidad blanda, deseado por Mariano Rajoy. Dos, demuestra que el euro NO es un derecho adquirido. Todo lo contrario. El coste económico, social y político de mantener el euro sera cada vez mas alto para los países altamente endeudados. La conclusión lógica de la crisis es una sola. La integración europea es irreversible pero la zona euro no lo es. Ni todos los países, entre los 17 miembros del euro, son aptos para mantener la moneda común en el futuro.

    http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2012/06/16/actualidad/1339843421_839209.html

  10. Costas Isychos, un argentino que nació en Quilmes hace 54 años -“pero hincha de Independiente”-, nieto de griegos que emigraron a la Argentina a principios del siglo XX, es una de las manos derechas de Alexis Tsipras, el joven líder de Syriza, la coalición de izquierda radical, que podría convertirse en el próximo primer ministro griego. Costas, que conserva la tonada porteña, vive en Grecia desde 1980 luego de haber estudiado en Canadá ciencias sociales. Trabajó en Olympic Airways, fue vicepresidente del sindicato de aeronavegantes y uno de los fundadores de Syriza en 1992, además de miembro del comité central. Conoce a Tsipras desde que tenía 17 años (ahora tiene 37) y se encarga de las relaciones internacionales del partido. Lo niega, pero se rumorea que, de ganar, sería ministro de Relaciones Exteriores o de Defensa. El argentino no oculta su entusiasmo. “Nunca creímos que íbamos a llegar a este punto. Nos adaptamos a la realidad de un día a otro, de pasar de ser un partido que obtenía el 4% de los votos a uno que podría superar el 30%. Tenemos una responsabilidad histórica muy grande”, comenta. Costas cree que Syriza está peleando contra un gigante, vista la “campaña sucia” que emprendieron los medios griegos en su contra, azuzando el fantasma del terror. “Están aterrando a la gente, diciendo que el lunes si ganamos no va a haber más comida, que cerrarán las escuelas y será la hecatombe”, denuncia, apuntándole al partido de centroderecha Nueva Democracia.

    http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1482511-un-argentino-es-la-mano-derecha-de-tsipras

  11. Why does the economic crisis in Europe keep getting broader and deeper? Ignorance? Too much power concentrated in too few hands? Or perhaps just the contrary: that those who ought to be making the necessary decisions lack the power to do so? I think it is a diabolical combination of these three factors (…..) In today’s world, power is greatly fragmented, and the European crisis is the clearest evidence of this trend. Even those who have the most power can influence the course of events only tenuously and indirectly. The crisis keeps going on, because in Europe, nobody has the power to contain it.

    http://www.huffingtonpost.com/moises-naim/why-is-europes-crisis-not-abating_b_1574323.html

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